Abstract: The doctrine of prospective overruling is a legal principle where a court’s ruling is applied to future cases, without affecting past transactions. Originating in American jurisprudence, it challenges the Blackstonian view that judges merely interpret laws rather than create them. The concept gained traction in India through the landmark case of “I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab”[1] (1967), where the Indian Supreme Court employed this doctrine to ensure that new rulings do not disrupt settled matters, providing a smooth transition without injustice to parties who relied on previous laws. Prospective overruling allows courts to overturn precedent and establish new legal principles without retroactively affecting decisions made before the judgment. While beneficial in avoiding legal instability and promoting judicial creativity, the doctrine has limitations. It applies only in cases involving constitutional interpretation and can be enforced solely by the Supreme Court. Critics argue that it creates uncertainty by acknowledging that laws deemed unconstitutional in the present remain valid for past cases. However, the doctrine ensures fairness by allowing time for adaptation to new legal standards and prevents disruption of prior decisions. By limiting retroactive application, prospective overruling ensures justice while accommodating evolving societal needs, making it a critical tool in constitutional law.

Keywords: Prospective Overruling; Judicial Precedent; Constitutional Interpretation; Legal Retrospectivity

1. Introduction

Judicial decisions are binding not only on the parties involved in the first case but also on any subsequent litigations that may arise. This encapsulates the core of precedent theory. When a court adjudicates a case, its rulings are both indicative and mandatory. Owing to its prescriptive character, courts will use it in future instances.[2] Precedent is a crucial and esteemed source of law. They serve as both a legal declaration and a fundamental component of the law. The regulation is often seen as retrospective, according to prevailing view. Individuals often assume that previous cases would similarly be affected by a court’s decision. The principle of legal precedents functions in this way.[3] Legal precedents are established statutes that provide direction for future instances. Events occurring prior to the implementation of the judgment are automatically included. The Blackstonian view posits that judges do not create laws but just articulate them. Proponents of the declaratory principle contend that precedent should be applied retrospectively. The date of a law’s enactment or approval is sometimes seen as the date from which it is deemed void.[4]

2. Origin and Historical Background of Doctrine of Prospective Ruling

In the early 1900s, when American legal thought diverged from the conventional Blackstonian framework, the concept of Prospective Ruling was first acknowledged.[5] The notion gained notoriety in the United States and was rapidly adopted by English courts and legal academics. English law often maintains that legislation influences only future events, but the judiciary is responsible for setting precedents that effect both past and future instances.[6] Some courts have introduced the concept of Prospective Ruling as an exception to established standards to avert unjust outcomes.[7]

It was in the landmark case of “I.C. Golaknath & Ors vs. the State of Punjab & Anrs”[8] (With Connected Petitions) (1967) that the Indian Supreme Court first acknowledged and accepted this principle. A case from 1967 involving the state of Punjab and others, known as “Golaknath & Ors vs. the state of Punjab and others”[9] (with related petitions). Multiple criteria for applying this theory were established by the Supreme Court in this judgment. The Supreme Court has often implemented this theory over the years, and these rules have served as precedent.

This case nullified the rulings in “Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo vs. Union of India”[10] (And Other Cases) (1951) and “Sajjan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan”[11] (With Connected Petitions) (1964). The court’s decision would not impact the previously enacted constitutional revisions, and there was no infringement of Article 13. The Constitutional Amendment was passed according to Article 12. Subsequent changes must adhere to the ratio established by the court in this matter.[12] Multiple judges articulated divergent perspectives in this case as well. Justice Bachawat’s interpretation of Article 368 includes the authority and procedure for amending the Constitution, including basic rights. Parliament is empowered to modify the Constitution. Parliament should not have the authority to modify the basic and essential structure of the Constitution, which includes critical components such as the concept of freedom and the principle of secularism. These portions are unalterable under any circumstances.[13]

The 1973 ruling in “Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and Ors vs. State of Kerala and Anr”[14] affirmed that while Parliament had the right to change the Constitution, this authority is not unlimited. Justice Wanchoo contends that the alterations instituted by Article 368 are distinct from those set out by other common laws. Justice Wanchoo asserts that ‘constituent power’ is a unique authority held by Parliament. The Constitution and basic rights may be modified using this authority.

3. Meaning and definition

“Overrule” implies to overturn, whereas “prospective” suggests an event occurring in the future.[15] The court may successfully overturn a precedent and establish new law via the theory of prospective overruling; but, this new rule will apply only to future cases, excluding any previous ones.[16] This shift in focus will not affect any choices already taken. The main motivation for using this philosophy is the achievement of justice. In some cases, the right to a fair trial is compromised by retroactive application.[17]  Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo believes that disregarding this principle would result in injustice.[18] The concept of Prospective Ruling enables adaptability to changing laws while preserving social equality, since rules are subject to modification over time.  Justice K. Subba Rao, a staunch advocate of this idea, said that its implementation would provide the foundation for future judgments.[19] The initiative will facilitate the identification of improved and new standards. The courts will achieve justice and provide a fair trial via the application of the doctrine.[20]

4. American Perspective on Doctrine of Prospective Ruling

The principle of Prospective Ruling developed in American jurisprudence.[21] Prior to its implementation and enforcement, the American court system adhered to the Blackstonian precept. This viewpoint asserted that the judicial branch lacked the authority to formulate new laws.[22] It claimed that the role of the legal system was limited to interpreting and clarifying existing laws. The notion of Prospective Ruling emerged from the dissent of certain American jurists who repudiated this premise. George F. Canfield, an American jurist, said that when a court determines that an obsolete rule is no longer relevant in the modern legal context, it is their duty to acknowledge the problem and formulate a new rule.[23]

5. Common Law perspective on Doctrine of Prospective Ruling

Jeremy Bentham and John Austin were English legal scholars who criticized the American Blackstonian doctrine.[24] Austin contends that the concept of a law emerging “miraculously” without coming from a court is pure fabrication.[25] Judges in judicial proceedings possess, and will continue to hold, the power to promulgate laws sometimes.[26]  In its 1966 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), the House of Lords recognized the untenability of the Blackstonian approach and affirmed the courts’ authority to modify or deviate from previous rulings and statutes as necessary[27]. In “Milangas vs. George Textiles Limited”[28], the House of Lords determined that the doctrine of prospective overruling pertains only to future transactions from the date of the ruling, therefore eliminating any antecedent transactions.

6. Benefits of Doctrine of Prospective Ruling

The principle of prospective overruling has been used for an extended duration, not just in India but globally, owing to its many benefits.[29] The principal benefit of the Prospective Ruling doctrine is the mitigation of injustice.[30] For example, it would be inequitable and harmful to the parties’ rights if the courts functioned retroactively, suggesting that any newly established laws would invalidate all previous judgments. The parties adhering to the applicable legislation would have been unfairly affected. Thus, the concept of Prospective Ruling may facilitate a seamless transition.  A further benefit of Prospective Ruling is that it promotes judicial creativity. Upon implementation, such a theory enables the alteration of laws and regulations to conform to the existing conditions. A pivotal verdict that modifies established legal doctrines by overturning precedents may provoke instability and disorder. The principle of Prospective Ruling alleviates this concern. The notion of prospective overruling allows parties sufficient time to adjust to the new legislation without encountering complications. It also obviates the need of revisiting all previous occurrences. The primary aim of the theory is to guarantee that newly enacted regulations or laws do not infringe upon any party’s rights.[31]

7. Drawback of Doctrine of Prospective Ruling

The theory of Prospective Ruling, while universally applicable, often faces criticism. A major worry is that the concept suggests that a law, although being deemed unconstitutional, has relevance in current proceedings, albeit it will not be enforced in future cases.[32] The folks concerned are likely to see this as unjust. Furthermore, it produces uncertainty and inconsistency. The adaption process may be prolonged, causing uncertainty and obstructing justice, since these limits apply just to future instances. The implementation of the concept of Prospective Ruling requires a case that raises a constitutional issue. The preservation of previously rendered but subsequently reversed judicial rulings is an additional guiding factor for the execution of this concept.  Only the Supreme Court have the authority to enforce the notion of Prospective Ruling. In India, the Supreme Court has the only ability to prescribe laws for all subordinate courts. Entities impacted by the annulment of a legislation may be afforded a period of adjustment under the doctrine of prospective overruling.[33] They have the opportunity to execute the necessary alterations to comply with their new legal standing during this timeframe. The concept of prospective overruling aids in preventing repeating procedures and requires the reassessment of all previously decided cases, demonstrating significant advantages. The court have the authority to evaluate cooperation retroactively. The courts may evaluate the application to guarantee justice and equality for all parties concerned.[34]

8. Judicial Pronouncement

When a court determines that a retroactive ruling may disrupt established things and induce uncertainty, it utilizes the theory of prospective overruling. To ensure equality, the court may evaluate the scope of the new laws and legislation. The Indian legal system was seen to be inconsistent with the principles of invalid ab initio legislation and the idea of Prospective Ruling. The declaration of a law’s unconstitutionality renders it null and void from the outset.  The society has followed these ideals for a prolonged duration; hence, any activities executed in alignment with them would be considered illegal. This may cause disturbances. The concept disallows the retroactive enforcement of a court’s ruling deeming legislation illegal, allowing the declaration to become effective just on the date of the ruling. The notion of Prospective Ruling is used to effectuate the necessary alterations in these instances.  The concept is often confined to situations that might impact public rights. The Supreme Court of India have unique authority to enforce this idea. The word is used in constitutional circumstances when a potential overruling case may affect previous rulings and society at large.

“M/S Steel Authority of India v. Mineral Area Development Authority”[35]

“The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957”[36], also known as “the Mines Act,” was promulgated by the federal government in 1957. Section 9 of the Mines Act stipulates that mining leaseholders are required to pay a royalty upon the extraction or use of any mineral from the leased area.

The Tamil Nadu Government awarded the mining lease to India Cement Ltd. in 1963. The Madras Panchayat Act of 1958 established a royalty accompanied by the necessary local cess. The limited liability business argued that the government lacked the authority to impose a royalty cess. The government may impose a fee, as defined by the single judge bench, since it constitutes a tax on the land. India Cement Ltd sought recourse from the Supreme Court after discontent with the decision of the single-judge bench. The royalty remitted is indirectly linked to minerals, as established by the seven-judge bench in the 1989 case of “India Cement Ltd vs. State of Tamil Nadu Etc.”[37] A three-judge panel concluded that the matter concerning India Cement Ltd.’s ruling was “prima facie” and sent the subject to a nine-judge panel for further examination.  The doctrine is now being implemented, as previous Chief Justice of India, K. Subba Rao, warned that allowing the retroactive enforcement of the verdict would result in turmoil and undermine the court’s stability. He recommended that the verdict be applicable only to future cases as a prudent approach to resolving complex matters.

“Waman Rao et al. v. Union of India (Uoi)”[38]

“The Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (1981)”[39] established certain limitations on agricultural holdings for individuals in the state of Maharashtra. The Act was included into the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. More than 2000 petitions contested the legitimacy of the Act in the Bombay High Court. The High Court ruled that the provisions of the Act, included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, are immune to contestation.

Prior to the verdict in “Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and Ors vs. State of Kerala and Anr (1973)”[40], the court established that the statute was included into the Ninth Schedule. The court distinguished between judgments rendered before to and after to the decision. The Supreme Court maintains that no issue determined prior to the ruling may be contested on the grounds of violating basic rights. Only events adjudicated after the court’s judgment may be cited.  The aims of the prior legislation were to alleviate social inequity and foster national advancement. Consequently, the law will only preserve the existing conditions. Previous transactions under the Act would remain legitimate notwithstanding the annulment of the regulations that preceded it, according to the principle of prospective overruling.

“Union of India and Others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan”[41]

In 1990, the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act modified Article 311 of the Constitution (Ramzan Khan). This change eliminated a juvenile offender’s access to the inquiry report of the disciplinary proceeding. Previously, it was essential to provide a rationale for termination to expel a criminal. The claim that it violated Article 14 and principles of natural justice sparked the challenge to the amendment.  The court, using the concept of prospective overruling, determined that no authority may make an order without justifying the imposed sanction as of the date of this ruling. The court sanctioned the workers’ request for remedy. The three-judge bench argues that all people possess the right to comprehend the reasoning behind an employee’s termination or suspension. Issuing an order without justification violates the tenets of natural justice.

The court evaluated the validity of the principle stated in “Managing Director Ecil Hyderabad Etc. … vs B. Karunakar Etc.”[42] In the Presence of Others (1993). The government employee was terminated from his position without sufficient justification or the results of the investigation. The appeal against this dismissal was based on claims of a breach of Article 14 and other tenets of natural justice.

The primary objective in applying the concept of prospective overruling in this instance was to ensure that current transactions executed under the previous system would not be negatively affected or rendered insignificant. The principle of prospective overruling asserts that a court’s decision will be applicable only to future instances. The termination in this case was not affected by the court’s decision in “Union of India vs. Mohamad Ramzan Khan (1990)”[43], since the government employee was terminated prior to the issuance of the verdict. The employee may initiate further actions by challenging the ruling on the basis that it violates the norms of natural justice

In “Orissa Cement Limited vs. State of Orissa (1991)”[44], the applicant-assessee challenged the states of Bihar, Orissa, and Madhya Pradesh in the Supreme Court, contending that the cess imposed on royalties on mining lands was unlawful as it exceeded their legislative authority. A request for the repayment of the accrued cess or royalties was also made. The pertinent law includes those from Orissa (1962), Bengal (1880), Madhya Pradesh (1981), and Maharashtra (1982) regarding cessation.

The Mandal Commission case, formally known as “Indra Sawhney Etc. vs. Union of India and Others (1992)”[45], addresses matters of quotas. The Mandal Commission advocates for an extra 10% allocation for socially and educationally/economically backward classes (SEBC) and a 27% reservation for other backward classes (OBC). Numerous persons saw the allocation of reserves exclusively based on caste as inequitable and unfair. The quota, as claimed by Indra Sawhney and her supporters, ought to be established solely based on economic grounds, excluding caste concerns.  The nine-judge panel reached its verdict by a majority of 6 to 3. They instituted a series of significant restrictions concerning reserves. The consequences of the decision will not become apparent until five years after the ruling date. This judgment was made to prevent affecting previous occurrences via the use of prospective overruling theory.

“Harsh Dhingra v. State of Haryana & Ors.”[46]

This lawsuit explicitly challenged Section 30 of the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 (2001). The authority to allocate plots is exclusively vested in the Chief Minister of Haryana. No governmental branch was authorized to examine this ruling. The unpredictable nature of the legislation and its potential violation of Article 14 were the principal objections against it.  The court sought to avert many actions and the reevaluation of established matters via the concept of Prospective Ruling. This might decrease ambiguity and superfluous legal disputes. This approach acknowledges that, in the public interest, any acts and transactions occurring before a law is declared unconstitutional are legitimized.  Inferior courts are obligated to adhere to the precedents set by superior courts on the probable application of law in all forthcoming matters under their jurisdiction. Judgmental legislation precludes Prospective Ruling, while being an aspect of constitutional policy and an expanded dimension of stare decisis.

9. Conclusion

The concept of prospective overruling asserts that a court’s judgment will impact transactions happening after the ruling, while leaving past transactions unaltered. Its application should be restricted to matters of constitutional interpretation. The Supreme Court is the only authority permitted to use it.  If the court determines that the case or subject matter is equitable, it may amend the components of its judgment pertinent to future applicability.  This principle, a core element of Indian law, protects public interest by invalidating previous agreements based on laws deemed illegal. The doctrine’s impact on the formation of India’s constitution is apparent. Implementing this idea will establish a balance between the nation’s evolving needs and equity. This method has been crucial in constitutional law for preventing inconsistencies resulting from the passage of new laws.

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[1] 1967 AIR 1643.

[2] Jeff King, A Theory of Judicial Restraint Judging Social Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[3] M. L. Friedland, “Prospective and Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking,” 24 The University of Toronto Law Journal 170 (1974).

[4] Saran and R. Dhivya, “Administrative Tribunals Under Indian Constitution”, 120 International Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics 02, (2018).

[5] “What is the Doctrine of Prospective Overruling – Jurisprudence – Legal Articles – Free Law,”available at: https://www.freelaw.in/legalarticles/What-is-the-Doctrine-of-Prospective-Overruling—Jurisprudence (last visited January 6, 2025).

[6] “Judicial Precedents: The Backbone of Legal Systems – Edzorb Law,”available at: https://edzorblaw.com/2024/08/29/judicial-precedents-the-backbone-of-legal-systems/ (last visited January 6, 2025).

[7] “Supreme Court Explains When Doctrine of Prospective Overruling Can Be Applied,”available at: https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/when-can-doctrine-of-prospective-overruling-be-applied-supreme-court-explains-267211 (last visited January 6, 2025).

[8] Supra Note 1 at 1.

[9] Ibid.

[10] 1951 AIR 458.

[11] 1965 AIR 845.

[12] “The Basic Structure of the Indian Constitution | ConstitutionNet,”available at: https://constitutionnet.org/vl/item/basic-structure-indian-constitution (last visited January 6, 2025).

[13] “Kesavananda Bharati: The monk who saved the Constitution,”available at: https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/kesavananda-bharati-the-monk-who-saved-the-constitution-1104199.html (last visited January 6, 2025).

[14] AIR 1973 SUPREME COURT 1461.

[15] “Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts,” 71 The Yale Law Journal 907 (1962).

[16] Mary Arden, “Prospective Overruling” Human Rights and European Law 267–71 (2015).

[17] Maria Alvarez, “Reasons and the ambiguity of ‘belief,’” 11 Philosophical Explorations 53–65 (2008).

[18] “Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921),”available at: https://www.constitution.org/1-Constitution/cmt/cardozo/jud_proc.htm (last visited January 6, 2025).

[19] “Eastern Book Company – Practical Lawyer,”available at: https://www.ebc-india.com/lawyer/articles/73v2a1.htm (last visited January 6, 2025).

[20] Arun K. Thiruvengadam, ‘Tribunals’, Chapter 23, pp-412-431, in Oxford handbook of the Indian Constitution, Oxford University Press, 2016 edited by Sujit Choudhry; Madhav Khosla; Pratap Bhanu Mehta, at p. 414.

[21] Samuel Beswick, “Prospective Overruling Offends the Rule of Law,” 2021.

[22] “Jurisprudence – The Doctrine of Prospective Overruling,”available at: https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/jurisprudence-prospective-overruling-in-reference-administrative-law-essay.php (last visited January 6, 2025).

[23] Walker, David M., Oxford Companion to Law, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-866110-X, 1980 at p.1239.

[24] S. Shubhang, “Legal Theories propounded by Bentham and Austin: A comparative study,” 1 International Journal of Advances in Social Sciences 29–33 (2013).

[25] “Freedom and Worldliness in the Thought of Hannah Arendt on JSTOR,”available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/190726 (last visited January 6, 2025).

[26] Ibid.

[27] Parliament of UK, “Statement to the House”, 26^th July 1966, available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199697/ldinfo/ld08judg/redbook/redbk45.htm. 

[28] (1976) AC 433.

[29] “Prospective Overruling – Constitutional Law and Philosophy,”available at: https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/tag/prospective-overruling/ (last visited January 6, 2025).

[30] “Stare decisis: Definition, examples and critical analysis,”available at: https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/blog/the-doctrine-of-stare-decisis/ (last visited January 6, 2025).

[31] Akash Krishnan, “Doctrine of Prospective Ruling”, Ipleader, October 10, 2024, available at https://blog.ipleaders.in/all-about-the-doctrine-of-prospective-overruling/#Judicial_application_of_the_doctrine_of_prospective_overruling (Last visited on October 21, 2024).

[32] Doreen Lustig and J. H.H. Weiler, “Judicial review in the contemporary world—Retrospective and prospective,” 16 International Journal of Constitutional Law 315–72 (2018).

[33] Ibid.

[34] Supra note 13 at page 3.

[35] 2024 INSC 554.

[36] Act no. 67 of 1957.

[37] 1990 AIR 85.

[38] (1981)2SCC362.

[39] ACT No. XXVII OF 1961.

[40] Supra note 7 at 2.

[41] 1991 AIR 471.

[42] AIR 1994 SUPREME COURT 1074.

[43] Supra Note 21 at 5.

[44] 1991 AIR 1617.

[45] AIR 1993 SUPREME COURT 477.

[46] AIR 2001 SUPREME COURT 3795.